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FORCED BUSINESS CLOSURES
Executive Orders by the Governor Closing Private Businesses
CODE SECTIONS:
EXECUTIVE ORDERS:

EFFECTIVE DATES:

SUMMARY:

O.C.G.A. §§ 38-3-3, -51
Ga. Exec. Order Nos. 03.14.20.01;
03.16.20.01; 03.23.20.01; 03.26.20.02;
04.01.20.01; 04.02.20.01; 04.08.20.04;
04.23.20.02; 04.27.20.01; 05.12.20.02;
05.21.20.01; 05.28.20.02; 06.11.20.01
March 14, 2020; March 16, 2020;
March 23, 2020; March 26, 2020; April
1, 2020; April 2, 2020; April 3, 2020;
April 8, 2020; April 23, 2020; April 27,
2020; April 30, 2020; May 15, 2020;
May 21, 2020; May 28, 2020; June 11,
2020
Governor Brian Kemp (R) issued
Executive Orders in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic that required
businesses to close in an effort to limit
the spread of the virus. Business
owners often challenged those forced
business closures as unconstitutional or
as exceeding the State’s police power,
and those challenges were met with
varying degrees of success.

Introduction
In December of 2019, Wuhan, China, reported a “cluster of novel
human pneumonia cases,” in which patients experienced fever, dry
cough, and shortness of breath. 1 The press initially termed the
phenomenon “Wuhan pneumonia” due to the area of origin and the
1. Yen-Chin Liu et al., COVID-19: The First Documented Coronavirus Pandemic in History, 43
BIOMED. J. 328, 328 (2020).
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symptomology of the disease, but whole-genome sequencing
revealed the “causative agent” behind these symptoms was actually a
novel coronavirus.2 Sometimes able to jump from animals to humans,
coronaviruses include “a large family of viruses that usually cause
mild to moderate upper-respiratory tract illnesses, like the common
cold.”3 Officially designated COVID-19 by the World Health
Organization (WHO) in February 2020, the virus swept through
Asian and European countries—quickly spreading worldwide and
ultimately reaching the United States in January 2020.4 On March 11,
2020, the WHO declared COVID-19 a “pandemic”—the first one
ever to be caused by a coronavirus. 5
Background
First Wave of Closures
After COVID-19 cases were reported in Georgia in early March,
Governor Brian Kemp (R) declared a Public Health State of
Emergency on March 14, 2020.6 This declaration made various
2. Id. (“[T]his virus is the seventh member of the coronavirus family to infect humans.”).
3. Overview of Coronaviruses, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES,
https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/coronaviruses [https://perma.cc/AZS5-GF8X] (May 19,
2020) (“There are hundreds of coronaviruses, most of which circulate among such animals as pigs,
camels, bats[,] and cats. Sometimes those viruses jump to humans—called a spillover event—and can
cause disease.”).
4. Liu et al., supra note 1 (“Since COVID-19 initially emerged in China, the virus has evolved for
four months and rapidly spread to other countries worldwide as a global threat.”); see also Derrick
Bryson Taylor, How the Coronavirus Pandemic Unfolded: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/7J2E-DMCG] (“The first
confirmed case in the United States came [on January 21, 2020] in Washington State, where a man in
his [thirties] developed symptoms after returning from a trip to Wuhan.”).
5. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19, WORLD
HEALTH
ORGANIZATION
[WHO]
(Mar.
11,
2020),
https://www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19--11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/TNW6-P5SB].
6. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.14.20.01 (Mar. 14, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review). Subsection (6) of Code section 38-3-3 defines “Public Health Emergency” as:
[T]he occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that is
reasonably believed to be caused by bioterrorism or the appearance of a novel or
previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent . . . and poses a high probability
of . . . a large number of deaths in the affected population . . . or . . . substantial future
harm to a large number of people in the affected population.
O.C.G.A. § 38-3-3(6) (2012 & Supp. 2019); see also Memorandum from Georgia Gov.’s Office on Pub.
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“legal and operational resources available to respond to an
emergency” and gave the governor a wide range of powers.7 Under
Code section 38-3-51, these powers include the ability “[t]o seize,
take for temporary use, or condemn property for the protection of the
public” and “[t]o perform and exercise such other functions, powers,
and duties as may be deemed necessary to promote and secure the
safety and protection of the civilian population.”8 Pursuant to these
powers, Governor Kemp issued the first wave of Executive Orders
closing schools and businesses in mid-to-late March.
Executive Order 03.16.20.01 shuttered all public elementary,
secondary, and post-secondary schools from March 18, 2020, until
March 31, 2020.9 Justified as a “necessary and appropriate action to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of Georgia’s residents and
visitors to help control the spread of COVID-19 throughout [the]
state,” issuance of this Order drew on powers given to the Governor
by subsection (d)(1) of Code section 38-3-51.10
Issued on March 23, 2020, Executive Order 03.23.20.01 closed all
bars and nightclubs for fourteen days pursuant to the Governor’s
power “to perform and exercise such other functions, powers, and
duties as may be deemed necessary to promote and secure the safety
and protection of the civilian population.”11 The Order also mandated
that businesses and other establishments could not allow more than
ten people in a single location unless people could remain six feet
Health State of Emergency to Members of the Georgia Gen. Assemb. (Mar. 15, 2020) (on file with the
Georgia State University Law Review) [hereinafter Public Health Memorandum].
7. Emergency Declarations and Authorities Fact Sheet of Emergency Authority and Immunity
Toolkit,
ASS’N
ST.
&
TERRITORIAL
HEALTH
OFFS.
(June
23,
2020),
https://astho.org/Programs/Preparedness/Public-Health-Emergency-Law/Emergency-Authority-andImmunity-Toolkit/Emergency-Declarations-and-Authorities-Fact-Sheet/
[https://perma.cc/F4CEGGCC].
8. O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51 (2012 & Supp. 2020); see also Public Health Memorandum, supra note 6.
9. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, at 2 (Mar. 16, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
10. Id. at 1; § 38-3-51(d)(1). Subsection (d)(1) of Code section 38-3-51 vests the Governor with the
emergency power to “[s]uspend any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state
business or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency,” provided that “strict compliance with
any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in
coping with the emergency or disaster.” § 38-3-51(d)(1); see also Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01,
supra note 9, at 1.
11. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01, at 1–3 (Mar. 23, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review).
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apart at all times. 12 Lastly, this Order vested the power to close
non-compliant businesses and other establishments in the Georgia
Department of Public Health (DPH) and also provided that the
Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety would allocate
additional resources to aid in the enforcement of the Order.13
On March 26, 2020, Governor Kemp issued Executive Order
03.26.20.02, which extended Executive Order 03.16.20.01 and closed
all public elementary, secondary, and post-secondary schools until
April 24, 2020, to stop the spread of COVID-19.14
Second Wave of Closures
As more information became available about the severity of the
virus, April saw a trend of stricter, more aggressive executive orders
coming from the Governor’s Office. Issued on April 1, 2020,
Executive Order 04.01.20.01 extended all school closures mandated
by Executive Order 03.26.20.02 through the end of the 2019–20
academic year.15
One day later, the Governor’s Office issued Executive Order
04.02.20.01, the most comprehensive Order, instructing “residents to
shelter in place unless they [were] conducting ‘essential services,’
either traveling to and from jobs[,] or taking part in other
exceptions.”16 As defined by the Order, “essential services” included
obtaining necessary supplies and services (such as food, medication,
or equipment to work from home), seeking medical care or
emergency services, and engaging in outdoor exercise activities so
long as participants maintained at least six feet of distance between
each person.17
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2–3.
14. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.26.20.02, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
15. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.01.20.01, at 2 (Apr. 1, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
16. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, at 2–3 (Apr. 2, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review); see also Greg Bluestein, Kemp Details Georgia’s Statewide Shelter in Place
Order, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/kemp-details-georgiashelter-place-order/hc3ETUjzBedtWW1LoJHTIP/ [https://perma.cc/YM8P-RVVU].
17. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 3.
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Certain businesses were treated differently than others under the
Order. For example, the Order mandated that all gyms, fitness
centers, bowling alleys, theaters, live performance venues,
amusement parks, tattoo parlors, hair salons, massage parlors, bars,
and nightclubs “cease in-person operations” entirely and remain
“close[d] to the public” throughout the duration of the Order.18
Restaurants and private social clubs could remain open, but they
were forced to cease dine-in services in lieu of takeout, curbside
pick-up, or delivery services.19
Businesses and other similar establishments engaging in
“minimum basic operations” could continue to operate but were
limited to a capacity of ten people unless all employees could
maintain a distance of six feet. 20 Further, these businesses had to
comply with a set of prescribed guidelines, such as providing
disinfectants for workers, screening workers for COVID-19
symptoms, and providing personal protective equipment as available
and appropriate.21
The Order contained an exception for businesses or entities
defined as “critical infrastructure” by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. 22 Businesses deemed “critical” could continue
in-person operations, as long as they implemented measures to
“mitigate the exposure and spread of COVID-19” among the
workforce.23 Unlike the specific set of provisions mandated for
businesses engaging in minimum basic operations, critical businesses
were encouraged—but not forced—to implement the safety measures
described in the Order.24 Shortly after Executive Order 04.02.20.01

18. Id. at 6–7.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 4–5. Under the Order, minimum basic operations were limited to the “minimum necessary
activities to maintain the value of a business, establishment, corporation, non-profit corporation, or
organization, provide services, manage inventory, ensure security, process payroll and employee
benefits, or for related functions.” Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 4–5; see also Bluestein, supra note 16.
22. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 5.
23. Id.
24. Id. Such safety measures could include screening workers for symptoms of COVID-19, requiring
workers with COVID-19 symptoms to stay at home, providing sanitation, requiring hand washing,
providing personal protective equipment, and implementing staggered shifts for all possible workers—
just to name a few. Id. at 5–6.
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was issued, the Governor issued Executive Order 04.08.20.04, which
suspended all short-term vacation rentals until May 1, 2020.25
Reopening Phase
On April 23, 2020, Governor Kemp attracted national attention
when he issued Executive Order 04.23.20.02, which reopened some
businesses and ended the strict shelter in place.26 The Order first
urged citizens to vigilantly observe public health precautions,
directing all people to wear face coverings and engage in social
distancing.27 It also ordered elderly and immunocompromised people
to continue sheltering in place within their homes.28 The Order
prohibited businesses from allowing more than ten people at a single
location if, to be present, people were required to stand or be seated
within six feet of any other person.29
The Order allowed dine-in restaurants to reopen in a very limited
capacity, restricting them to no more than ten patrons within 500
square feet of public space. 30 Additionally, dine-in restaurants were
required to follow a list of thirty-nine precautions listed in the
Order.31 The Order also allowed non-essential businesses, gyms and
fitness centers, salon and body art studios, indoor movie theaters, and
bowling alleys to reopen as long as they followed a list of specified
precautions.32 Not all businesses were permitted to reopen, however;

25. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.08.20.04, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
26. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, at 2 (Apr. 23, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review); Amanda Mall, Georgia’s Experiment in Human Sacrifice, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 29,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/04/why-georgia-reopening-coronaviruspandemic/610882/ [https://perma.cc/GC2P-UD9U]. This Executive Order provided clear definitions of
many COVID-19 terms, including gathering, social distancing, and essential services. Ga. Exec. Order
No. 04.23.20.02, supra, at 3–4.
27. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 26.
28. Id. at 4–5.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. at 7–8. “Public space” included waiting and bar areas, but does not include hallways,
restrooms, and spaces closed to patrons. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 7–9.
32. Id. at 11, 14–15.
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the Order mandated public swimming pools and amusement parks
remain closed until May 13, 2020. 33
Over the next few weeks, Governor Kemp released several
Executive Orders to provide additional guidance to businesses that
were reopening.34 On June 1, 2020, bars and nightclubs were
permitted to reopen if they implemented thirty-nine mandatory
measures.35 Even with the wave of business openings, live
performance venues remained closed based on the reasoning that it
was in the best interest of public health. 36 As COVID-19 restrictions
eased, restaurant owners remained uncertain whether customers
would feel comfortable sitting two feet from the table next to them or
whether they would want to remain six feet apart.37
Analysis
Are These Forced Business Closures Constitutional?
Other state governors who issued similar Executive Orders
shuttering businesses in response to COVID-19 experienced legal
backlash from business owners. 38 Specifically, three common
constitutional challenges to similar state Executive Orders emerged
from business owners. First, business owners argued that forced
business closures exceeded the state’s police power.39 Second,
33. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 26, at 12.
34. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.27.20.01 (Apr. 27, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.12.20.02 (May 12, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.21.20.01 (May 21, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.28.20.02 (May 28, 2020) (on file with the Georgia
State University Law Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 06.11.20.01 (June 11, 2020) (on file with the
Georgia State University Law Review).
35. Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.28.20.02, supra note 34, at 7–10.
36. Georgia Gov. Kemp Renews State of Emergency; Rolls out Opening Dates for More Businesses,
FOX 5 ATLANTA (May 28, 2020), https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/georgia-gov-kemp-renews-stateof-emergency-rolls-out-opening-dates-for-more-businesses [https://perma.cc/VYP3-35Z8]. Governor
Kemp reasoned, “I know these closures are tough on business owners and their employees, but we will
continue to watch the data to ensure the health and safety of our citizens.” Id.
37. Telephone Interview with Jarrett Stieber, Owner, Little Bear Food & Merch. (June 20, 2020) (on
file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
38. See, e.g., Complaint, Tesla, Inc. v. Alameda Cnty., 20-cv-3186, 2020 WL 2356208 (N.D. Cal.
May 9, 2020); Friends of DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 873 (Pa. 2020).
39. Elizabeth Joh, Yes, States and Local Governments Can Close Private Businesses and Restrict
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business owners argued that these Executive Orders violated their
substantive and procedural due process rights under Fourteenth
Amendment.40 Lastly, some business owners argued that shuttering
businesses constituted an impermissible “taking” under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, incorporated against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.41 The following Sections
analyze these various claims in the COVID-19 context.
The Police Power
States have broad authority to mandate business closures during a
pandemic through their police power.42 The police power is
incredibly broad and sweeping, and it is an inherent attribute of state
sovereignty.43 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
affirms states’ police power “as a reminder that the national
government is one of limited authority and that those powers that the
people did not give to the federal government remain with the states
and the people.”44 The term “police power” first appeared in Brown
v. Maryland, a case addressing the constitutionality of a Maryland

Your
Movement,
POLITICO
(Mar.
18,
2020,
6:16
PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/18/states-police-power-coronavirus-135826
[https://perma.cc/8LEH-GLX3].
40. Joshua T. Lewis, Constitutional Challenges to Government COVID-19 Measures Mount, FROST
BROWN TODD (Apr. 10, 2020), https://frostbrowntodd.com/constitutional-challenges-to-governmentcovid-19-measures-mount/ [https://perma.cc/478P-ZCPE]; Mark D. Taticchi et al., Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Upholds Business-Closure Order, Rules that COVID-19 Is a ‘Natural Disaster,’
FAEGRE
DRINKER
(Apr.
16,
2020),
https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2020/4/pennsylvania-supreme-court-upholdsbusiness-closure-order [https://perma.cc/2FF4-6LLP].
41. David Jacobs, Federal Judge Upholds Louisiana Bar Restrictions, WASH. EXAM’R. (Aug. 18,
2020,
3:00
PM),
https://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/federal-judge-upholds-louisiana-barrestrictions [https://perma.cc/55C8-YES5].
42. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 78 (1824).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 78; see also Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day
Musings on the Police Power, 47 URB. LAW. 625, 626 (2015); Santiago Legarre, The Historical
Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 781–96 (2017) (“Nowadays, insofar as the
expression is used in American constitutional law, the phrase ‘police power’ normally refers to the
authority of the states for the promotion of public health, public safety, public morals, and public
welfare.”).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Ohm, supra note 43. The Tenth Amendment simply states, “[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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regulation that required importers of foreign goods to obtain a license
to do so.45 In Brown, Chief Justice John Marshall first referenced the
police power when he stated, “[t]he power to direct removal of
gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably
remains, and ought to remain, with the States.”46 In Gibbons v.
Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall further detailed the leviathan
nature of police power:
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation,
which embraces every thing within the territory of a State,
not surrendered to the general government: all which can
be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves.
Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal
commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike
roads, ferries, &c.[,] are component parts of this mass.47
Nearly a century later, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court held states may use the police power to enact quarantine laws
and “health laws of every description,” so long as the laws are
reasonable and protect public health and public safety. 48 In other
words, states may restrict civil liberties to limit the spread of a
communicable disease as long as the state actions have a reasonable
relationship to public health. 49 Courts adopt a very deferential
45. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 443 (1827), abrogated by Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 471, 474 (2004).
46. Brown, 25 U.S. at 443; Barros, supra note 45.
47. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 78. In Gibbons, the Court found New York ultimately lacked the power to
restrict navigation under the Commerce Clause, though it was within its police power. Id.; see also, e.g.,
State v. McKay, 193 S.W. 99, 100 (Tenn. 1917) (holding Tennessee law requiring labeling of seed
packets was “an attempted exercise by the state of the police power, which was one of the powers
reserved to the states in the national Constitution”); Legarre, supra note 43, at 792–93 (“[W]hen the
courts today . . . make reference to the acknowledged ends of the police power (‘public health, safety,
morals, welfare’) they do so . . . to provide non-exhaustive examples of the goods that the police power
may promote.”). Theoretically, a state could limit its police power by proscribing such legislation in its
own constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
48. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905).
49. Id.; Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed: Yes, Businesses Have Been Hurt by Coronavirus Closures, but
They Won’t Get Relief from the Courts, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-04-29/op-ed-yes-businesses-have-been-hurt-by-
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standard of review regarding state actions taken during a public
health emergency and will likely find state actions bear a reasonable
relationship to public health as long as they are not completely
arbitrary.50 At first glance, Jacobson may not seem relevant to forced
business closures in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic—it was an
early twentieth-century case that analyzed whether the Massachusetts
state government could mandate smallpox vaccinations.51 Because it
is one of the few cases analyzing the police power as applied to
communicable disease, however, it has become a seminal case to
analyze forced business closures in the wake of COVID-19.52
States’ use of the police power to close certain businesses during
public health emergencies may be limited by the First and Second
Amendments.53 In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court denied a
church’s request for injunctive relief pending appeal in Calvary
Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak after the State of Nevada ordered
houses of worship to limit services to no more than fifty persons to
combat the spread of COVID-19.54 At the same time, Nevada
allowed secular gatherings, such as casinos, to operate at 50%
capacity, which in many cases exceeded the fifty-person limit
imposed on houses of worship. 55 Justice Alito dissented from the
Court’s denial of injunctive relief, concluding that Nevada’s actions
constituted discrimination under the First Amendment; Justice Alito
also discouraged lower courts from blindly applying Jacobson
precedent during the COVID-19 pandemic: “It is a considerable
stretch to read [Jacobson] as establishing the test to be applied when
statewide measures of indefinite duration are challenged under the
First Amendment or other provisions not at issue in that case.”56
coronavirus-closures-but-they-wont-get-relief-from-the-courts [https://perma.cc/UZ9Y-G3CV].
50. Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police Powers of the State, 120 PUB.
HEALTH REPS. 20, 21 (2005).
51. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–25.
52. Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 49 (“The Supreme Court has held [in Jacobson] that restrictions of
civil liberties are allowed to limit the spread of a communicable disease, so long as there is a real and
substantial relationship to public health. This is why quarantine orders are constitutional, even though
they greatly restrict freedom.”).
53. Telephone Interview with Eric Segall, Ashe Family Chair Professor of L., Ga. State Univ. Coll.
of L. (June 19, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
54. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020).
55. Id. at 2603–06 (Alito, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2603, 2606.
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Further, it is possible that the Second Amendment precludes states
from using the police power to close firearm retailers and shooting
ranges during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Altman v. County of Santa
Clara, however, the Northern District of California held that a county
Order mandating closures of all businesses, including firearm
retailers and shooting ranges, was constitutional because it was
facially neutral and treated all businesses alike.57 However, it is
possible that a court could find closures of firearm retailers and
shooting ranges unconstitutional if those businesses were treated
differently from other businesses, as Justice Alito noted in his dissent
in Calvary Chapel, stating that Nevada’s restrictions discriminated
against houses of worship.58
Here, Georgia officials acted within the state’s police power to
force businesses to close during the COVID-19 pandemic because its
actions were in the interest of public health.59 In Gibbons, the
Supreme Court explicitly stated that quarantine laws and health laws
are permissible uses of a state’s police power. 60 Georgia’s forced
business closures were rooted in serious public health concerns, as
evinced by Governor Brian Kemp’s (R) Executive Orders, which not
only closed businesses but also ordered elderly and
immunocompromised people to shelter in place within their homes.61
In fact, the sole purpose of the forced business closures was to
prevent the spread of COVID-19 and to protect the “health, safety,
and welfare of Georgia’s residents and visitors.”62 Even though
57. U.S. CONST. amend. II; Altman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. 20-cv-2180, 2020 WL 2850291, at
*1, *12 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2020).
58. Compare Altman, 2020 WL 2850291, at *1, *12, with Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2603–06
(Alito, J., dissenting).
59. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12–13 (1905); Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01,
supra note 9, at 1 (“Further action is necessary to protect the health and safety of the population of
Georgia, slow the spread of COVID-19, reduce the number of people who will become infected, and
avoid unnecessary strain on Georgia’s healthcare system . . . .”); see also David French, The Police
Power of the States to Control a Pandemic, Explained, THE DISPATCH (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://thedispatch.com/p/the-police-power-of-the-states-to [https://perma.cc/9JSK-J7J4]; Damon Root,
Police Powers During a Pandemic: Constitutional, but Not Unlimited, REASON (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:00
PM), https://reason.com/2020/03/18/police-powers-during-a-pandemic-constitutional-but-not-unlimited/
[https://perma.cc/E2AH-M8CM] (proposing a framework to analyze whether public health laws are
within a state’s police power).
60. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 78 (1824).
61. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 2, 6–7.
62. Id. at 2.
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Georgia’s forced business closures did not directly govern health
issues like the Massachusetts law requiring smallpox vaccinations in
Jacobson, they were nonetheless related to public health because they
were enacted for the purpose of stemming the unchecked spread of
COVID-19.63
Further, Georgia’s forced business closures were a constitutional
exercise of the state police power because they did not violate
individual liberties protected by the First and Second Amendments.
Georgia’s Executive Orders mandating business closures did not
implicate First Amendment issues because they did not treat houses
of worship differently from secular businesses.64 Unlike Nevada’s
Executive Order detailed in Calvary Chapel, which limited houses of
worship to fifty attendees but allowed hundreds of patrons to enter
casinos at the same time, Georgia’s Executive Orders imposed no
restrictions on houses of worship that were not also imposed on
secular businesses.65 Georgia’s forced business closures did not
violate the Second Amendment because the Executive Orders
explicitly did not apply to the operation of stores selling firearms and
ammunition.66 Georgia’s forced business closures were more
deferential to citizens’ Second Amendment rights than the business
closures at issue in Altman because Georgia allowed firearms and
ammunition retailers and transporters to remain open during the
COVID-19 pandemic.67 Finally, Georgia’s use of the police power to
close businesses in the context of a pandemic was not prohibited by
the Georgia Constitution or laws enacted by the state legislature.68

63. Id.; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12–13.
64. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16.
65. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020); Ga. Exec. Order No.
04.02.20.01, supra note 16; see also Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, supra note 9.
66. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 9.
67. Id.; Altman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. 20-cv-2180, 2020 WL 2850291, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal.
June 2, 2020).
68. See O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51(d)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2020); GA. CONST. art. I, § III, para. 1(a).
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Fourteenth Amendment Challenges to Forced Business Closures
The Fourteenth Amendment provided two main avenues for
business owners to challenge forced business closures.69 First,
business owners argued that the forced business closures violated
their substantive and procedural due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Second, business owners argued that the
forced business closures constituted a “taking” requiring payment of
just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, both claims face significant uphill battles—
for “[e]ven in usual times, judicial deference to the government’s
ability to regulate the economy is enormous, and it will be even
greater in the context of a pandemic.”70
Forced Business Closures as Violations of Due Process Rights
Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States contain a Due Process Clause.71 The Fifth
Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving people
“of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”72 Likewise,
the Fourteenth Amendment repeats this language—extending its
applicability to states and thus barring them from these same
categories of deprivations.73 Despite the vague language, these
constitutional provisions carry special importance: they “impose
constraints on governmental actions or decisions which deprive
persons of interests.”74 In defining the scope of these constraints, the
Supreme Court has established that neither the federal nor state
governments may interfere with life, liberty, or property by taking
legislative actions that are considered “arbitrary or without

69. Friends of DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 873 (Pa. 2020).
70. Chemerinsky, supra note 49.
71. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § I.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
74. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1883 (2020).
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reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state to effect.”75
State constitutions often contain similar limitations on
governmental powers, and Georgia’s Constitution is no exception. 76
Specifically, Article I, Section I of the Georgia Constitution provides:
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property except by
due process of law.”77 Similarly, the “individual interests” protected
by the Due Process Clause are life, liberty, and property.78
Substantive due process protects certain categories of liberty interests
from government infringement “no matter what process is provided,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.”79 On the other hand, procedural due process
scrutinizes the constitutionality of procedures used to deny a person’s
life, liberty, or property.80
If a fundamental right or a protected class is not involved in the
litigation, courts apply a rational basis test to determine whether a
governmental action violated a plaintiff’s substantive due process
rights.81 Under this standard, courts do not require that the
government’s action be “the best, or even the least intrusive, means
available to achieve its objective.”82 In fact, the means adopted by the
action do not violate due process so long as they bear a “rational
relationship to a legitimate [objective] of the government.”83
Therefore, only arbitrary or irrelevant actions offend notions of due
process under the rational basis test. 84
75. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
76. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1; Policy Guide on the Takings, Substantive Due Process, and
Regulatory
Takings
Doctrines,
AM.
PLAN.
ASS’N:
MICHIGAN
CHAPTER,
https://www.planningmi.org/assets/docs/Policies/MAP%20Takings%20Substantive%20Due%20Process
%20and%20Regulatory%20Takings%20Background.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW8U-THUJ].
77. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. V; 16 C.J.S., supra note 74.
79. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
80. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
81. Old S. Duck Tours v. Mayor & Alderman of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869, 872, 535 S.E.2d 751, 754
(2000).
82. City of Lilburn v. Sanchez, 268 Ga. 520, 522, 491 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1997).
83. Georgia Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Sweat, 276 Ga. 627, 630, 580 S.E.2d 206, 211 (2003).
84. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution that prohibited gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals from bringing claims of
discrimination based on their sexual orientation as violating the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause under rational basis review, reasoning that laws premised on animus toward
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Amid the pandemic, business owners brought lawsuits challenging
the constitutional validity of forced business closures, arguing that
the mandatory closure of all non-essential business violated their
right to “engage in the common occupations of life” and the right to
pursue their “chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental
interference.”85 Because forced business closures have not been held
to implicate a fundamental right, courts have employed rational basis
review to evaluate the constitutionality of the business closures. 86
Although government actions subject to rational basis review
generally survive constitutional scrutiny, one district court in
Pennsylvania recently struck down the State’s forced business
closures as “so arbitrary in its creation, scope, and administration as
to fail constitutional scrutiny.”87 The court in County of Butler v.
Wolf conducted a fact-specific inquiry into the extent to which the
Governor of Pennsylvania crafted an Executive Order that closed
businesses arbitrarily. 88 In finding that the Governor of Pennsylvania
acted arbitrarily, the court considered, among other factors, the lack
of a formal definition of what constituted “non-life-sustaining”
businesses, the overlap of products and services sold between
“life-sustaining” and “non-life-sustaining” businesses, and the State’s
eventual closure of the waiver application process due to a wavier
requests backlog.89
Whether Governor Kemp’s forced business closures violated the
due process rights of business owners would likely be subject to the
same fact-intensive judicial scrutiny employed in Wolf.90 In support
of the State’s position that Governor Kemp’s Executive Order
closing nonessential businesses bears a “rational relationship” to the
historically-oppressed classes may indicate a lack of rational relationship); see also Old S. Duck Tours,
272 Ga. at 872, 535 S.E.2d at 754–55 (providing legal standard for rational basis review in Georgia).
85. Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, No. 20-CV-677, 2020 WL 5510690, at *25 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2020).
86. Id. (evaluating the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s forced business closures during the
COVID-19 pandemic and striking down the Executive Orders as violating Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
87. Id. at *26 (“Even with this forgiving standard as its guide, the Court nevertheless holds that the
March 19, 2020 Order closing all ‘non-life-sustaining’ businesses was so arbitrary in its creation,
scope[,] and administration as to fail constitutional scrutiny.”).
88. Id. at *26–27.
89. Id. at *27–29.
90. Id.; Old S. Duck Tours v. Mayor & Alderman of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869, 872, 535 S.E.2d 751,
754 (2000).
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state’s objective of limiting and controlling the spread of COVID-19,
Governor Kemp would justify the closures as “necessary and
appropriate action[s] to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
Georgia’s residents and visitors to help control the spread of
COVID-19 throughout [the] state.”91 Further supporting the
Governor’s position would be that the actions taken fell “within the
scope of the police power.”92 However, the court’s decision in Wolf
introduces uncertainty into how a federal court in Georgia might
resolve the same constitutional questions posed by business owners
challenging the closure of their businesses. Though courts tend to be
“very deferential” to the state when confronted with violations of due
process claims, whether forced Georgia business closures would pass
constitutional muster under the Due Process Clause remains
uncertain.93
Takings Claims Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Another frequent constitutional challenge against forced business
closures in other states was that these state-mandated closures
violated business owners’ rights under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which was incorporated against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.94 In addition to protecting people from
infringement of due process rights, the Fifth Amendment prohibits
the federal government from taking private property for public use
“without just compensation.”95 Similarly, the Georgia Constitution
also provides that the State of Georgia cannot take or damage private
property for public use without adequate and just compensation.96 In
assessing a takings claim, Georgia courts balance the State’s interest
in regulation against a property owner’s interest in unfettered use of
91. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16; see also Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01,
supra note 9, at 1.
92. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 584 (1929).
93. Chemerinsky, supra note 49.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; see also Richard Frank, Do Epidemic-Based Business Closures by
Government Trigger an Unconstitutional “Taking”?, LEGAL PLANET (May 7, 2020), https://legalplanet.org/2020/05/07/do-epidemic-based-business-closures-by-government-trigger-an-unconstitutionaltaking/ [https://perma.cc/4UA2-DALM].
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. GA. CONST. art. I, § III, para. 1(a).
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property to determine the propriety of using police power to
regulate.97
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court held that a
government action depriving a landowner of “all economically
beneficial or productive use of the land” was a public taking
requiring just compensation. 98 In Lucas, a man bought beachfront
properties with the intent to develop them, but before he could, the
state legislature enacted a statute barring him from erecting any
permanent habitable structures on the land. 99 The Court explained
that two types of takings can occur: one that encompasses
“regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical
‘invasion’ of his property” and a second situation “where regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land.”100
In regards to permanent physical invasions, the Court has
explained that “no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter
how weighty the public purpose behind it,” governmental intrusion
upon another’s land requires just compensation.101 For example, in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court
held that a cable installation on a building constituted a “taking”
because it involved a permanent “physical attachment of plates,
boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building.”102 Importantly,
however, this type of taking must constitute “an actual physical
invasion” of the property.103 The Court has also acknowledged a
second type of taking in which a government regulation imposes
restrictions that deprive property owners of the beneficial use of their
property.104 Such “confiscatory regulations” include government
mandates that prevent property owners from using their land in an
economically beneficial manner.105 Because the forced business
97. Pope v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331, 333–35, 249 S.E.2d 16, 18–20 (1978).
98. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–19 (1992).
99. Id. at 1006–07.
100. Id. at 1015.
101. Id.
102. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982).
103. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
104. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (“[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922))).
105. Id. at 1029 (defining confiscatory regulations as “regulations that prohibit all economically
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closures arose from the regulations imposed by Governor Kemp
rather than from any forced physical appropriation of actual property,
the Executive Orders are best analyzed under the regulatory takings
framework.106
Unlike physical takings, the concept of regulatory takings is not
explicitly defined within the four corners of the Constitution. 107
Rather, courts have recognized that regulatory takings jurisprudence
has traditionally been “characterized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries,’ designed to allow ‘careful examination and weighing of all
the relevant circumstances.’”108 Courts have grappled with whether
all regulations that effectively deny property owners of economically
beneficial uses of their land should constitute a compensable taking,
recognizing that some government intrusions into property rights
may be necessary to “adjust[] the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good.”109 As such, courts have declined
to adopt a categorical rule requiring governmental agencies to
compensate landowners for deprivations of economic use of land
resulting from government regulations.110 Thus, challengers “face an
uphill battle” when contesting government regulations that affect the
use of their property.111
Despite the lack of a categorical rule, courts have recognized that
property owners are still entitled to compensation when a regulation
beneficial use of land”).
106. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 n.17 (2002)
(observing that a regulatory takings challenge “contends a taking has occurred because a law or
regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation”);
Elizabeth Wolstein, Do State Shut-Down Orders Effect a Taking for Which the State Must Pay Just
Compensation?,
N.Y.
L.
J.
(Apr.
22,
2020,
10:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/04/22/do-state-shut-down-orders-effect-a-taking-forwhich-the-state-must-pay-just-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/69XC-PJKY].
107. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321.
108. Id. at 332 (first quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
then quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001)).
109. Id. at 324–25 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). Courts have accepted extensive policy
arguments against finding that all regulatory prohibitions on land use constitute a compensable taking,
primarily acknowledging the effect such a rule would have on the efficiency and effectiveness of the
operation of local governments. Id. at 335 (“A rule that required compensation for every delay in the use
of property would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty
decision[-]making.”).
110. Id. at 342.
111. Id. at 320 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987)).
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results in a “total taking” of the property.112 In Lucas, the Court
established that a total taking occurs when a regulation imposes a
permanent prohibition of the intended use of a property, thus
depriving the owner of “all economically beneficial” value of the
property.113 Subsequent cases have clarified, however, that Lucas
stands to apply only in the ‘“extraordinary’ case in which a
regulation permanently deprives property of all value.”114 The Court
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency declined to extend Lucas to cover temporary
prohibitions on particular uses of land.115 In Tahoe-Sierra, members
of a nonprofit development group and individual owners of vacant
lots located in the Lake Tahoe basin challenged a thirty-two-month
moratorium and an eight-month moratorium on development of
property located within a portion of the basin.116 The Court
distinguished Lucas because the moratoria only temporarily deprived
the property owners of the originally intended economic use of the
land, rather than permanently prohibiting development in the area.117
As a result, the Court held that when a regulation falls short of the
extraordinary line drawn in Lucas—when the regulation causes only
a temporary deprivation of the economically beneficial use of the
property—the Court must embark on a more fact-specific inquiry to
determine whether a compensable taking has occurred.118
Under this more fact-intensive inquiry, courts typically consider
factors such as the cumulative economic impact of the regulation and
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations.”119 Because the analysis requires a
“careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances,” however, courts must also consider how the

112. Id. at 331.
113. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
114. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 342.
116. Id. at 306–12. The record established that the individual lot owners purchased the land prior to
the imposition of the moratoria and did so with the intent to construct residences on the property. Id. at
312–13.
117. Id. at 330–31.
118. Id. at 335.
119. Id. at 321–22; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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challenged regulations promote fairness and justice.120 Additionally,
courts provide substantial deference to states imposing confiscatory
restrictions when such regulations serve a substantial public service,
such as the promotion of the health, safety, and general welfare of the
community.121 For example, courts typically afford states leeway in
regulating land use under its “complementary power to abate
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.”122 This
vague “otherwise” includes “litigation absolving the State (or private
parties) of liability for the destruction of ‘real and personal property,
in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire’ or to
forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of others.”123 As
an illustration, the Court in Miller v. Schoene held that the State of
Virginia was not required to compensate tree owners when the State
destroyed privately-owned red cedar trees to stop the spread of a
cedar rust infection to apple orchards because the Virginia legislature
provided statutory authority for the State to do so.124 The Court
reasoned that “where the public interest is involved[,] preferment of
that interest over the property interest of the individual—to the extent
even of its destruction—is one of the distinguishing characteristics of
every exercise of the police power which affects property.”125
Specifically, the Court determined that the “only practicable method
of controlling the disease and protecting apple trees from its ravages”
was the destruction of the red cedar trees. 126
Because Governor Kemp’s Executive Orders forced only
temporary business closures, the Orders did not leave the property
owners with a “total loss” of the economically beneficial use of the
120. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 33 U.S. 606, 636 (2001)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)) (“We conclude . . . that the interest in ‘fairness and justice’ will be best
served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by
attempting to craft a new categorical rule.”). Such policy concerns include whether the regulations affect
the government’s ability to operate efficiently, whether the regulations promote effective planning to
protect the interests of the affected parties, and whether the regulations result in individualized harm. Id.
at 337–42; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125 (citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)).
121. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125, 127.
122. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
123. Id. at 1029, n.16 (quoting Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1880)).
124. Miller, 276 U.S. at 277 (“The Virginia statute presents a comprehensive scheme for the
condemnation and destruction of red cedar trees infected by cedar rust.”).
125. Id. at 280.
126. Id. at 279.
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property and are therefore likely constitutional.127 Unlike the
permanent physical installation on the building in Loretto or the
complete disallowance of all future land development in Lucas,
COVID-19-forced business closures were intended to be
temporary—only lasting long enough to curb the spread of
COVID-19.128 The temporary nature of the business closures was
akin to the moratoria imposed in Tahoe-Sierra, though lasting for
only a fraction of the time. 129 The Executive Orders only forced
Georgia businesses to close their doors for six weeks before
reopening again, as opposed to the thirty-two-month moratoria
imposed in Tahoe-Sierra that still fell short of constituting a
compensable permanent deprivation of all economic benefit.130
Though the temporary closures undoubtedly deprived the business
owners of their intended use for the property, the deprivation of
economic benefit for six weeks fell far short of constituting a threat
of “permanent ‘obliteration’ of the value” of the property at issue.131
Additionally, Governor Kemp’s Orders fell within the State’s
power to protect the public. Like in Miller, Governor Kemp was
faced with a decision to either sit idly as COVID-19 continued to
spread rapidly throughout the state or impose certain executive
restrictions favoring the public interest over competing private
business interests, like interests of the cedar tree owners in Miller.132
Just as the spread of a cedar rust infection amongst cedar and apple
trees justified a government’s order to destroy privately-owned trees,
127. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330, 332
(2002).
128. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 2–3; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07;
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982). The statutory prohibition
on development in Lucas was ultimately amended during the litigation to authorize certain exceptions to
the development restrictions. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012. However, the Court declined to consider the
State’s argument that the deprivation deserved to be analyzed as only a temporary taking because the
statute, at the time of the challenge, was “unconditional and permanent.” Id.
129. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16; see also Ga.
Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, supra note 9; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 26.
130. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332; Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, supra note 9; Ga. Exec. Order
No. 03.23.20.01, supra note 11; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16; Ga. Exec. Order No.
04.23.20.02, supra note 26; see also Mall, supra note 26.
131. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019–20); see also Ga. Exec. Order No.
03.16.20.01, supra note 9; Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01, supra note 11; Ga. Exec. Order No.
04.02.20.01, supra note 16; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 26.
132. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
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the spread of a deadly pandemic justified Governor Kemp’s ordered
business closures.133 As courts have recognized, prohibitions of
particular uses of land may be justified where the government
reasonably concludes that such prohibitions or restrictions promote
the health, safety, or general welfare of the community.134 Here, the
Executive Orders even explicitly state that such business closures
were imposed to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.135 Moreover, the
Orders reflect an attempt of the Georgia government to impose swift,
uniform regulations that avoided the risk of individualized harm,
analogous to the risk to the individual that the Court weighed in favor
of the state regulation in Tahoe-Sierra.136 Because the COVID-19
pandemic presented health concerns across the entire State of
Georgia, it was necessary for Governor Kemp to mandate uniform,
temporary restrictions to help quell the spread of the deadly virus. 137
Therefore, courts would likely show deference to the temporary
forced business closures under Takings Clause jurisprudence because
the closures were ordered to combat the spread of COVID-19.138
Due to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry into whether a
temporary land-use regulation constitutes a compensable taking,
some courts could find specific circumstances more persuasive than

133. Id.; see also Ilya Somin, Does The Takings Clause Require Compensation for Coronavirus
Shutdowns?,
REASON:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Mar.
20,
2020,
10:20
PM),
https://reason.com/2020/03/20/does-the-takings-clause-require-compensation-for-coronavirusshutdowns/ [https://perma.cc/WSW2-NL4P]. Professor Ilya Somin referenced Miller when he stated
why he thought forced business closure lawsuits would not succeed: “Protecting large numbers of
people from the spread of a disease is, of course, a much stronger police power imperative than
protecting apple trees.” Id.
134. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 103, 125 (1978).
135. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 1.
136. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (“Moreover, with a temporary ban on development[,] there is a
lesser risk that individual landowners will be ‘singled out’ to bear a special burden that should be shared
by the public as a whole.”).
137. Id. at 340 (“Indeed, the interest in protecting the decisional process is even stronger when an
agency is developing a regional plan than when it is considering a permit for a single parcel.”). Courts
have recognized that, in the situation where large areas are faced with similar threats, temporary
land-use restrictions deserve a degree of deference because they allow the government time to perform
added due diligence to ensure appropriate long-term measures are taken rather than rushing to make an
uninformed decision. Id. at 340–41 (recognizing that forcing decisionmakers to make hasty decisions
absent deliberations with interested parties “would only serve to [further] disadvantage those
landowners and interest groups” challenging the temporary restrictions).
138. Chemerinsky, supra note 49.
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other courts.139 While business owners continued to challenge similar
regulations across the country, scholars remained pessimistic of the
ultimate likelihood of success of such challenges. 140 Because of the
latitude afforded to state officials in times of emergency, courts were
most likely to find that such temporary restrictions did not constitute
a total deprivation of all economically beneficial use of property and
that such mandates were, moreover, necessary to promote the health
and safety of the community. 141
Conclusion
Due to the state of uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 and the
large scope of power afforded to federal, state, and local governments
during a public health emergency, challenges to the constitutionality
of Governor Brian Kemp’s (R) Executive Orders were likely to fail.
Legal challenges to the forced business closures could include that
the forced closures exceeded the scope of the State’s police power,
violated business owners’ due process rights, or constituted
impermissible takings requiring the payment of just compensation.
Even though these forced business closures caused devastating
effects for business owners across the state of Georgia, preventing
the spread of COVID-19 likely qualified as a reasonable—and
constitutional—justification for this economic harm.
Baylee A. Culverhouse & Alexa R. Martin

139. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335.
140. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 94.
141. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).

Published by Reading Room,

23

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [], Art. 12

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss1/12

24

